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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY - OPEN
RECORDS: NORTH DAKOTA UPHOLDS PERSONNEL
FILE AS GOVERNMENTAL RECORD OPEN FOR
PUBLIC INSPECTION*
Meredith Hovet was employed by the Hebron Public School
District (School District) as a teacher during the 1986-87 school
year.' During the course of Hovet's employment, a personnel file
was maintained by the School District.2 In June 1987, the School
District agreed to grant Madonna Tibor's request to review
Hovet's personnel file.3 Hovet sought a permanent injunction
enjoining the School District from allowing the review of his per-
sonnel file by anyone other than a legal representative of the
School District.4 Hovet also sought a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the review.5 A hearing was held and a temporary
restraining order was granted.6
At trial, Tibor argued that the personnel file was a public rec-
ord open to inspection under sections 44-04-187 and 15-29-10 of
* The 1989 North Dakota Legislature addressed a bill that would have closed teachers'
files to all but school administrators and school board members. H.R. 1254, 51st Leg.
Assembly (1989). The bill to close teachers' files to the public was prompted by the North
Dakota Supreme Court's ruling in the comment case, Hovet v. Hebron Pub. School Dist.,
419 N.W.2d 189, 190 (N.D. 1988). The controversial bill was approved in the House and
Senate but was vetoed by Governor George Sinner. Grand Forks Herald, Apr. 11, 1989, at
B.1, col.1. The House voted 55-49 to override but that margin was 16 votes short of the
two-thirds majority needed to override the Governor's veto. Id.
1. Hovet v. Hebron Pub. School Dist., 419 N.W.2d 189, 190 (N.D. 1988). Hovet taught
business education and physical education during the 1986-87 school year. Id. He had
been employed by the Hebron Public School District (School District) for the previous
three school years. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. Madonna Tibor, a "parent and patron" of the School District, requested that the
School District allow her to review Hovet's personnel file by a letter dated May 21, 1987.
Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment at 1, Hovet v. Hebron Pub. School Dist.,
419 N.W.2d, 189 (N.D. 1988XCiv. No. 15167Xtrial court decision); Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at
190. On June 2, 1987, the superintendent for the School District agreed to provide a
review of Hovet's personnel file. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. At the hearing in which the temporary restraining order was granted, the trial
court also ordered that Tibor become a party to the action. Id.
7. N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1978). Section 44-04-18 of the North Dakota Century
Code provides:
1. Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all records of public or
governmental bodies, boards, bureaus, commissions or agencies of the state
or any political subdivision of the state, or organizations or agencies
supported in whole or in part by the public funds, or expending public funds,
shall be public records, open and accessible for inspection during reasonable
office hours.
2. Violations of this section shall be punishable as an infraction.
Id.
8. Id. § 15-29-10 (Supp. 1987). Section 15-29-10 of the North Dakota Century Code
provides: "The records, vouchers, and papers of the [school] district are open to
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the North Dakota Century Code, and article XI, section 6 of the
North Dakota Constitution. 9 Hovet and the School District both
acknowledged that the personnel file was a governmental rec-
ord.' ° However, Hovet and the School District argued that the
personnel file was confidential pursuant to an implied exception to
the open records law provided in section 15-47-38 of the North
Dakota Century Code" and chapter 15-38.2 of the North Dakota
Century Code.' 2 Hovet also argued that his privacy right, as guar-
anteed him by the United States and North Dakota Constitutions,
would be violated if the public was allowed to inspect his person-
nel file. 13
The trial court determined that Hovet's personnel file was a
examination by any taxpayer of the district. These records, or a transcript thereof certified
by the business manager, must be received in all courts as prima facie evidence of the facts
therein set forth." Id.
9. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 190. See N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6. Article XI, section 6 of the
North Dakota Constitution provides:
Unless otherwise provided by law, all records of public or governmental bodies,
boards, bureaus, commissions, or agencies of the state or any political subdivision
of the state, or organizations or agencies supported in whole or in part by public
funds, or expending public funds, shall be public records, open and accessible for
inspection during reasonable office hours.
Id.
10. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 190. The concession by the parties that a personnel file is a
governmental record was based on a previous determination by the North Dakota Supreme
Court that a personnel file is a public record under the open-records law. Id. See City of
Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d 572, 578 (N.D. 1981Xformer police chief's
personnel file is a public record under the open records law). For a discussion of Grand
Forks Herald see infra notes 108-124 and accompanying text.
11. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 191. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-38 (Supp. 1987). Section
15-47-38 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that "the meeting [to determine a
teacher's discharge] shall be an executive session of the board unless both the school board
and the teacher shall agree that it shall be open to other persons or the public." Id. Hovet
argued that the procedures outlined in § 15-47-38 were designed to facilitate openness in
the proceedings and to protect the teacher's reputation. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 191. Hovet
and the School District reasoned that opening a teacher's personnel file - which would be
reviewed at the executive session proceedings held to determine a teacher's discharge - to
the public, endangered these stated goals. Id.
12. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 192. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 15-38.2 (Supp. 1987). Chapter
15-38.2 of the North Dakota Century Code generally provides that a teacher has a right to
review his or her personnel file, to make written comments on anything placed in that file,
and to have those comments attached to the file. Id. The chapter also prohibits the use of
secret personnel files to which the teacher does not have access. Id. However, chapter 15-
38.2 of the North Dakota Century Code does not specifically address the status of teacher
personnel files. Id.
13. Hovet, 419 N.w.2d at 192. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969Xconstitutional rights are not shed at the schoolhouse gate). In
Hovet, Hovet argued that his violation of privacy was comparable to the privacy violation
found in Tinker, stating that "[t]eachers, like students, do not 'shed their constitutional
rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.'" Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 192. But see Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986Xhomosexual sodomy is not protected by a privacy right
recognized by the Federal Constitution); City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, 307
N.W.2d 573, 578-79 (N.D. 1981Xpersonnel records are not protected by a right to privacy
arising under the Federal Constitution or the North Dakota Constitution).
1989] CASE COMMENT 243
public record open for inspection.14 On appeal, the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and held that
Hovet's personnel file was a public record open for inspection
under sections 44-04-18 and 15-29-10 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code and article XI, section 6 of the North Dakota Constitu-
tion.15 Hovet v. Hebron Public School District, 419 N.W.2d 189
(N.D. 1988).
While the Hovet court found a statutory and constitutional
right to inspection of public records, a general right of the public
to inspect governmental records and documents was not recog-
nized by the common law.16 The English courts gradually devel-
oped a limited right of access for those who sought to obtain
evidence for use in litigation. 7 This "litigation interest" rule was
accepted in the United States and was gradually expanded to allow
inspection of governmental records by those seeking to defend the
public interest.'
However, even at the turn of the century, some important
barriers to public access remained to those attempting to get
access to records in the United States. 9 If the requestor's purpose
was improper, such as curiosity, maliciousness, or commercial
14. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 191. The trial court issued a judgment of dismissal Id. at
190.
15. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1978Xpublic or governmental records are
open for public inspection except as otherwise specially provided by law); Id. § 15-29-10
(Supp. 1987Xtaxpayers of the district may examine the records, vouchers, and papers of the
district); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6 (public or governmental records are open for public
inspection unless otherwise provided by law). Tibor also requested that the School District
be required to pay her costs and attorney fees incurred in litigating the issue of whether
Hovet's personnel file was a governmental record open for public inspection. Hovet, 419
N.W.2d at 193. The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to do so because Tibor failed to
perfect a cross-appeal on the issue as required by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id.;
N.D.R. App. P. 3.
16. H. CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 25 (1953).
17. Compare Rex v. Tower, 4 M and S 162, __, 105 Eng. Rep. 795, 795 (1815Xcourt
granted mandamus to lord to permit him to inspect the court-rolls of his manor even
though no suit was pending) and Rex v. Lucas, 10 East 235, __, 103 Eng. Rep. 765, 765
(1808Xone who has prima facie title to a copyhold is entitled to inspect the court-rolls and
take copies of them, even though no suit is pending) with Rex v. Allgood, 7 T.R. 746, -, 101
Eng. Rep. 1232, 1232 (1798Xfreehold tenant of a manor has no right to inspect the court-
rolls unless some cause is pending in which his right may be involved).
18. See, e.g., Nowack v. Fuller, 243 Mich. 200,-, 219 N.W. 749, 751 (1928Xplaintiff, as
a citizen and tax-payer, has a common-law right to inspect the public records in the
auditory general's office); In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, -, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893xjudicial
records of the state should be accessible to the public under reasonable restrictions as to the
time and mode of examination, but should not be used to gratify private spite or promote
public scandal).
19. See Watkins, Access to Public Records Under the Arkansas Freedom of Information
Act, 37 ARK. L. REV. 741, 745 (1984Xauthor suggests that some barriers to public access
would include prohibiting access to those records which would be detrimental to the public
and those records that were on file at the government agency, but were not required by law
to be kept).
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gain, inspection of the public records was not permitted.2 ° In
addition, if disclosure of the information would be detrimental to
the public interest, a governmental body could withhold the
records.2' Moreover, a record was considered a "public record"
subject to disclosure only if it was one "required to be kept" by
state law.2
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that there is
a "paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the
people concerning public officials."' 23 However, the first amend-
ment to the United States Constitution has not been construed to
include a general right of public access to governmental records
and proceedings. 24 Thus, the task of providing for access to partic-
ular governmental information and requiring openness from the
bureaucracy has fallen to Congress and the states.2 5
Early North Dakotans appreciated the concept of the public's
right to know.26  As the state proceeded to draft a growing
number of statutes, various provisions for open meetings and open
20. See, e.g., Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, -, 63 A. 146, 154 (1906Xinspection was
allowed where the individual seeking to inspect vouchers kept by the State Auditor
provided that the inspection was not actuated by motives of curiosity). But see State ex rel.
Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, -, 57 N.E. 535, 537 (1900Xrelater, being one who
contributes to the public revenue, is entitled to inspect public records despite allegations of
curiosity).
21. See, e.g., State ex rel. Denson v. Miller, 204 Ala. 234, -, 85 So. 700, 701 (1920Xto
know the names upon the jury roll is to know the names within the jury box and such
knowledge may result in serious evils in the administration of justice by jury trial).
22. See, e.g., Linder v. Eckard, 261 Iowa 216, -, 152 N.W.2d 833, 836 (1967Xappraisals
of appellant's property were not records required to be kept and, therefore, were not
public records within the contemplation of the open records statute); Nero v. Hyland, 76
N.J. 213, -, 386 A.2d 846, 851 (1978Xcharacter investigations made at the behest of the
Governor as chief executive in connection with a contemplated nomination are not public
records under New Jersey's Right to Know Law because they are not required by law to be
made, maintained, or kept on file by any agency or official of the State).
23. Garrison v.-Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 2 (1978Xnews
media have no constitutional right of access to the county jail, over and above that of other
persons, to interview inmates and make sound recordings, films, and photographs for
publication and broadcasting by newspapers, radio, and television); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 835 (1974Xprohibiting the media from interviewing prison inmates does not
infringe upon freedom of speech or the right of a free press). But see Richmond
Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 555 (198OXabsent an overriding interest
articulated in the findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public).
25. See Watkins, supra note 19, at 741 (outlining the history of the development of
open records statutes). The federal government, all 50 states, and the District of Columbia
have enacted some type of open meetings legislation and every state except Mississippi has
passed open records states. Id. at 741-42 n.4. The North Dakota open meetings and open
records statues are collected in Guy & McDonald, Government in the Sunshine: The Status
of Open Meetings and Open Records Laws in North Dakota, 53 N.D.L. REV. 51 (1976). The
federal provisions dealing with open meetings and open records are codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 552, 552b (1982).
26. Guy & McDonald, supra note 25, at 51. As early as 1872, laws providing for posting
and publication of notices of regular and special township meetings were passed in North
Dakota. Id.
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records gradually crept into North Dakota law.2 7 However, no sin-
gle statute covered all meetings or records.28 In the early 1950s
Sigma Delta Chi, a national journalism association, drafted model
open meetings and open records statutes, and encouraged its state
chapters to enact these model statutes. 29 The North Dakota chap-
ter of Sigma Delta Chi endorsed the model set of open meetings
and open records statutes at its 1956 meeting and then sought to
encourage the North Dakota Legislature to enact the statutes for
the State.3 °
On February 1, 1957, open meetings
31 and open records3 2
measures were introduced in the North Dakota Legislature by a
bi-partisan group of legislators.3 3 The open meetings and open
records bills were referred to the House Committee on Political
Subdivisions where they met some opposition.34 In spite of a rec-
ommendation given by the House Committee on Political Subdivi-
sions to indefinitely postpone the open records measure, the North
Dakota House of Representatives unanimously passed both meas-
ures on February 14, 1957.35
The two bills were assigned to the Senate General Affairs
Committee which reported both bills out of committee on Febru-
ary 27, 1957.36 The Senate General Affairs Committee recom-
mendations were adopted by the entire Senate on February 27,
1957. 3 ' The North Dakota Senate thereafter passed the open
27. Id. at 52. For examples of statutes dealing with North Dakota's open meetings and
open records provisions, see A Digest of North Dakota Laws Pertaining to Access to Public
Meetings and Information, compiled by Rep. Ralph Beede, Republican, Elgin, North
Dakota, and presented at the annual meeting of the North Dakota chapter of Sigma Delta
Chi, the professional journalism fraternity, in Valley City, North Dakota, in April 1954.
28. Guy & McDonald, supra note 25, at 52.
29. Id. at 53. The model open meetings and open records statutes drafted by Sigma
Delta Chi in the early 1950s were similar to the measures introduced to the North Dakota
legislature in 1957. Id.
30. Id. The North Dakota Press Association also endorsed the model open meeting
and open records statutes. Id.
31. H.R. 694, 35th Leg., 1957 N.D. Laws 590.
32. H.R. 695, 35th Leg., 1957 N.D. Laws 591.
33. H.R. J. 695, 35th Leg. Assem. of N.D. 181 (1957Xindicating that there were five
sponsors of the open records bill: Rep. Walter 0. Burk, (Dem.-Williston); Rep. Arthur A.
Link (Dem.-Alexander); Rep. Norbert Muggli (Rep.-Dickinson); Rep. Hjalmer Nygaard
(Rep.-Enderlin); and Rep. Murray Baldwin (Rep.-Fargo).
34. Guy & McDonald, supra note 25, at 53. The Senate General Affairs Committee
recommended passing the open meetings bill. H.R. J. 694, 35th Leg. Assem. of N.D. 332
(1957Xpassed by a vote of 16 to 2). However, the Senate General Affairs Committee voted
to recommend "indefinite postponement" for the open records measure. H.R. J. 695, 35th
Leg. Assem. of N.D. 332 (1957Xpassed by a vote of 19 to 8).
35. Guy & McDonald, supra note 25, at 53. The votes by the North Dakota House of
Representatives for the open meetings and open records measures were both 111 to 0.
H.R. J. 694, 695, 35th Leg. Assem. of N.D. 398-99 (1957).
36. Guy & McDonald, supra note 25, at 53.
37. Id. See S. J. 694,695, 35th Leg. Assem. of N.D. 570 (1957). The open meetings and
open records bills were re-referred to the Senate General Affairs Committee by the full
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records bill on March 6, 1957.38 On March 8, 1957, the open
meetings bill was also passed by the North Dakota Senate.39
Because of persistent communications between legislators and
the press, North Dakota established two comprehensive statutes
dealing with open meetings and open records.4" These statutes
have not been amended since they were passed.4 1 The North
Dakota open records statutes provides: "Except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, all records of public or governmental bodies, boards,
bureaus, commissions or agencies of the state, or organizations
supported in whole or in part by public funds or expending public
funds, shall be public records, open and accessible for inspection
during reasonable office hours."'4
2
A state's general open meetings and open records statutes are
not the sole determinants of whether documents are subject to
public disclosure.4 3 All states have laws that restrict or grant
access to certain information in specific areas.44 In addition to the
general North Dakota open records provision, there are other vari-
ous provisions which govern open records for particular govern-
mental bodies.45 For example, records of county coroners,46 the
Senate. Guy & McDonald, supra note 25, at 53. The Senate General Affairs Committee
then sent the open meetings and open records bills back to the full Senate with attached
committee reports. Id. There was a significant amount of debate when the open records
bill came before the North Dakota Senate for a vote on March 6, 1957. Id. at 53, n.16. A
number of senators joined in criticizing the bill, stating that the bill was overly broad. Id. at
n.16. The committee reports were, however, adopted and placed on the calendar without
recommendation. S. J., 35th Leg. Assemb. of N.D. 681 (1957).
38. Guy & McDonald, supra note 25, at 53. See S. J. 695, 35th Leg. Assem. of N.D. 724
(1957Xopen records bill passed by a vote of 29 to 18).
39. Guy & McDonald, supra note 25, at 53. See S. J. 694, 35th Leg. Assem. of N.D. 877
(1957Xopen meetings bill passed by a vote of 30 to 13).
40. Guy & McDonald, supra note 25, at 53. For a compilation of the comments
between legislators and the press regarding the statutes dealing with open meetings and
open records, see N.D. PRESS Ass'N, THE NORTH DAKOTA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
STORY (1957Xrevealing communications such as letters to the editor, public statements, and
editorials that occurred between the legislators and the press). For the text of the North
Dakota open meetings statute, see ch. 306, 1957 N.D. Laws 590 (codified at N.D. CENT.
CODE § 44-04-19 (1978)).
41. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (1978Xgovernmental meetings are open to the
public); Id. at § 44-04-18 (1978Xgovernmental records are open for public inspection).
42. Id. at § 44-04-18 (1978).
43. Braverman & Heppler, A Practical Review of State Open Records Laws, 49 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 720, 724 (1981).
44. Id. at 724. State open record laws generally defer to the specific statutes which
grant or restrict access to certain information through a specific exemption or through a
definition of "'public records." Id. These specific disclosure statutes have been relied on by
state courts in granting or prohibiting disclosure of records sought under the state open
records laws. Id.
45. Id.
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-19.1-08 (1985Xall records of the coroner are property of the
county and are public records).
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State Highway Department, 47  and charitable organizations
required to file their records with the Secretary of State 48 are open
to the public. However, records kept by the Department of
Health,49 the Social Service Board,5" the Employment Secretary
Bureau, as well as several other agencies or departments are
closed from public inspection by specific statutory exceptions. 2
The most common example of statutes that restrict access to
an otherwise disclosable record are state privacy laws.53 The
United States Constitution has not been interpreted to expressly
protect a right of privacy contravening the openness of govern-
mental records. 4 However, as state statutes have been created to
restrict access to otherwise disclosable information, the United
States Supreme Court has similarly construed several provisions of
the United States Constitution to protect the privacy rights of indi-
viduals in information contained in public records.55 Generally,
privacy interests that are the result of an individual interest pro-
tected by a specific constitutional amendment receive constitu-
tional protection.
5 6
47. Id. at § 24-02-11 (Supp. 1987Xfiles and records of the State Highway Department
shall be open for public inspection under reasonable regulations).
48. id. at §§ 50-22-03 to -04 (1982Xrecords of charitable organizations filed with the
Secretary of State are public records).
49. Id. at § 23-02.1-27 (1978XState Department of Health may authorize the disclosure
of data contained in vital records).
50. Id. at § 50-06-15 (1982Xrecords kept by the Social Service Board concerning
persons applying for or receiving public assistance are not open for public inspection).
51. Id. §§ 52-01-02 to -03 (1982XEmployment Security Bureau records determining
the benefit rights of individuals are confidential and not open for public inspection in any
manner revealing the individual's or employing unit's identity).
52. Guy & McDonald, supra note 25, at 69-80 (discussing open records provisions).
53. Braverman & Heppler, supra note 43, at 724. Only a small number of states have
not yet enacted privacy statutes. Id. at 725. An example of a state's statutory privacy
scheme can be found in South Dakota's privacy legislation which prohibits disclosure of
adoption records, certain birth records, and income tax return information. See S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-6-15(Supp. 1988Xrestrictions on access to court records); 34-25-
16.4 (1986Xsealing of original birth certificates); 10-1-28.2 (1982Xlists compiled by
department of revenue are confidential).
54. Thompson, Public Employees Financial Disclosure Law Requiring Detailed
Disclosure from Low Echelon Employees Not Unconstitutional, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 337, 339
(1984). The right to privacy from undue intrusion by a private entity is generally protected
by tort law rather than by the Constitution. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B-E
(1977Xaddressing the tort of invasion of privacy). See generally Warren & Brandies, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HAnv. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890Xthe original discourse from which most
current tort law concerning privacy developed).
55. Thompson, supra note 54, at 339.
56. Id. The first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution
have been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to protect privacy rights within
specific contexts. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969Xright of an individual
to read an obscene book within the privacy of the home is covered under the first
amendment protection of freedom of speech and association); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967Xprivacy and sanctity of one's home is protected by the third
amendment's prohibition against unconsented peacetime quartering of soldiers); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (196lXfourth amendment is applied to protect individuals from
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The United States Supreme Court has identified two different
types of privacy interests:57  "One is the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest
in independence in making certain kinds of important deci-
sions."158 Past decisions in which the United States Supreme Court
has established that a right of privacy exists have been in cases
involving governmental intrusions into matters relating to mar-
riage, 9 procreation,6 ° contraception,6" and child rearing and edu-
cation.6 2 However, the Court has recently refused to extend the
right of privacy to protect private homosexual sodomy between
consenting adults.6 3
The United States Supreme Court has also extended a narrow
right of privacy in a selected number of cases that deal with the
person 4 and the home.65 However, the court has also limited
invasion of the privacy of the home); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886Xfifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination encompasses invasion of "the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life"). Some justices of the United States Supreme Court
have also interpreted the ninth amendment as providing a source of fundamental interests
which, though not specified in the Constitution, are nonetheless protected. See, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965XGoldberg, J., concurringXban on
contraceptives violated the zones of privacy). The Ninth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
57. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977Xconstitutionally protected "zones of
privacy" involve the right of an individual not to have his private affairs made public by the
government, and the right of an individual to be free in action, thought, experience, and
belief from governmental compulsion).
58. Id. at 598. Under the autonomy branch of an individual right to privacy,
constitutional protection has thus far been limited to intimate personal activities and the
freedom to make fundamental choices involving oneself, one's family, and one's
relationship with others. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976Xinterest in reputation,
by itself, is not a constitutionally protected privacy interest); see generally Thompson, supra
note 54 at 342 (discussing applications of the different types of privacy interests).
59. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967Xright of privacy protected when
dealing with marriage).
60. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973Xright of privacy extended to the
abortion context).
61. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965Xright of married
persons to use contraceptives fell within a zone of privacy guaranteed by the Bill of Rights).
62. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925Xprivacy interest
protects the right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of children).
63. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986). In Bowers v. Hardwick the
United States Supreme Court upheld a Georgia law prohibitin consensual sodomy as
applied to homosexuals. Id. at 195. The Court, however, did not comment on the validity
of the law as applied to heterosexuals. Id. at 195-96. Therefore, because the United States
Supreme Court placed a strong emphasis on the fact that Bowers involved homosexual
sodomy, it left open the possibility that an attempt to prohibit heterosexual sodomy might
violate one's right to privacy. Id. at 188 n.2.
64. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). In Katz the Court
acknowledged that the fourth amendment protects people - not simply "areas" - against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and that therefore, the Government's electronic
listening to and recording of Katz' words while he used a telephone booth constituted an
impermissible invasion of privacy. Id. at 353.
65. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed'I Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392-93
(1971Xaction of FBI agents who entered Bivens' apartment, searched it, arrested Bivens,
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these zones of privacy in a decision involving a claim of a right to
privacy which would prohibit the maintenance of computerized
records of prescriptions for dangerous drugs. 6 In Whalen v. Roe67
the Court concluded that maintaining computerized records of
prescriptions for certain dangerous drugs did not constitute an
invasion of any liberty or right protected by the fourteenth
amendment." The Whalen v. Roe decision further strengthens
the United States Supreme Court's statement in a 1967 decision
that "the protection of a person's general right to privacy - his
right to be left alone by other people - is, left largely to the law of
the individual states."
69
All but a small number of states have enacted privacy statutes
which restrict access to otherwise disclosable records.7 0 For exam-
ple, South Dakota's privacy legislation restricts access to adoption
records and certain birth records71 and to income tax return infor-
and threatened his family, all without a warrant and without probable cause, constituted an
impermissible invasion of privacy).
66. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977Xmaintaining computerized records of
prescriptions for certain dangerous drugs did not constitute an invasion of privacy).
67. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
68. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606 (1977). In Whalen the New York statute at issue
set up a system in which the names and addresses of all patients who received prescriptions
for certain drugs were placed on a central computer. Id. at 591. The prescription
information was taken from reports which doctors were required to file with the State
Health Department. Id. at 592. The United States Supreme Court recognized a right of
privacy encompassing a general individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters. Id. at 602. Despite recognizing this general right, the Court concluded that New
York's statutory scheme for maintaining computerized records of prescriptions for certain
dangerous drugs did not constitute an invasion of any right protected by the fourteenth
amendment even though the patient identification requirement imposed by the law could
affect the reputation or independence of the patients. Id.
69. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
70. Braverman & Heppler, supra note 43, at 724.
71. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-6-15 (1976 & Supp. 1988), 34-25-16.4 (1977).
Section 25-6-15 of the South Dakota Codified Laws Annotated provides:
The files and records of the court in adoption proceedings shall not be open to
inspection or copy by other persons than the parents by adoption and their
attorneys, representatives of the department of social services, and the child
when he reaches maturity, except upon order of the court expressly permitting
inspection or copy. No person having charge of any birth or adoption records
shall disclose the names of any parents, or parents by adoption, or any other
matter, appearing in such records, except upon order of the circuit court for the
county in which the adoption took place or other court of competent
jurisdiction.
Id. at § 25-6-15 (1976 & Supp. 1988). Section 34-25-16.4 of the South Dakota Codified Laws
Annotated provides:
When a new certificate of birth is established purusant to §§ 34-25-15 to 34-25-
16.2 [relating to legitimation of children and adoption], inclusive, the original
certificate of birth together with the adoption information or other evidence
upon which a new certificate is made shall be sealed, filed, and may be opened
only upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction, or by the secretary of
health for purposes of properly administering the vital registration system.
Id. at § 34-25-16.4 (1977).
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mation.7 2 Several states have enacted statutes that prohibit the
disclosure of "trade secrets" or comparable business information.73
Statutes have also been invoked to protect various records includ-
ing working papers of property tax assessors, 74 police records and
records of criminal proceedings of an acquitted defendant,75 com-
plaints filed with a council on judicial complaints,76 and inmates'
prison records.77
Some state courts recognize a fundamental right to privacy
for governmental employees' personnel files, regardless of
whether the state has enacted informational privacy statutes.7 8
The issue of whether the disclosure of performance evaluation
reports, completed by the directors of various departments of the
City of Lafayette, constituted an impermissible invasion of privacy
was raised in the Louisiana case of Trahan v. Larivee. 9 Trahan, a
radio station general manager and vice president, requested
access to evaluation reports of city employees below the director
level."0 The Louisiana Court of Appeal determined that perform-
72. Id. at 10-1-28.2 (1982). Section 10-1-28.2 of the South Dakota Codified Laws
Annotated provides: "All lists of taxpayers, licensees, or applicants compiled by the
department of revenue are confidential. It is a Class 2 misdemeanor to disclose any such list
except to the extent necessary to carry out the official duties of the department." Id.
73. See Braverman & Heppler, supra note 43, at 725 n.28 (listing twenty-one states
with statutes prohibiting disclosure of trade secrets or comparable business information).
See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-107 (1986), 41-1959 (1985 & Supp. 1988), 23-426
(1983).
74. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 408(a) (West i987 & Supp. 1989Xrecords of
property tax assessors not required by law to be kept are not open for public inspection).
75. See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142 (West 1985 & Supp.
1989Xrestricting access to non-conviction information).
76. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1658 (West Supp. 1989xjudicial complaints
filed with the Council on Judicial Complaints are not open to the public).
77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2081-5 (West 1982Xcomplete case records of prisoners are
made available to the Board of Prison Terms).
78. See, e.g., Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So.2d 294, 300 (La. Ct. App. 1978Xdisclosure of
written documents prepared to evaluate the job performance of various department heads
in the city administration and containing notes on the department heads' job interest,
cooperation, and other items would be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy); writ denied,
366 So.2d 564 (La. 1979).
79. 365 So.2d 294,298-99 (La. Ct. App. 1978); writ denied, 366 So.2d 564 (La. 1979). In
Trahan the initial question asked by the appellate court was whether performance
evaluation reports of city employees constituted "public records." Id. at 298. The reports
were written documents prepared at the request of the chief elected official of the City of
Lafayette and were to be used to evaluate various city employees. Id. The Louisiana Court
of Appeal found that these reports constituted "public records" as set forth by the
legislature. Id. Having concluded that the performance evaluation reports constituted
"public records," the court had to determine if publication or disclosure of these records
should be denied as being an invasion of privacy under the provisions of the Louisiana
Constitution. Id. at 298-99; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (every person shall be secure against
invasions of privacy).
80. Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So.2d 294, 296 (La. Ct. App. 1978); writ denied, 366 So.2d
564 (La. 1979). Evaluations of the city employees were conducted purusant to the direction
of the mayor with the chief administration officer serving as the evaluator. Id. at 296.
Trahan, who was the vice president and general manager of KVOL radio station, gave
Larivee, chief administrative officer for the city of Lafayette, the person entrusted with the
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ance evaluation reports of city employees did fall within the statu-
tory definition of "public records.-8 1 However, the Louisiana
Court of Appeal held that to publish or disclose such reports would
constitute an invasion of the city employees' privacy.
8 2
The Louisiana Constitution specifically addresses the issue of
privacy in article I, section 5, which provides in part: "Every per-
son shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures,
or invasions of privacy."
' 3
A fundamental right of privacy also appears in the Montana
Constitution.8 4 In Missoulian v. Board of Regents of Higher Edu-
cation s5 the Montana Supreme Court analyzed the privacy provi-
sion of the Montana Constitution and held that job performance
evaluations of university presidents were matters of individual pri-
vacy and that presidents' privacy interests clearly exceeded the
public's constitutional and statutory right to know.86 The Board of
records, written notice that he intended to request access to the evaluation reports. Id. at
295, 296. Larivee advised Trahan that access would be granted only if Trahan received
written consent from each individual director. Id. at 296. Only one of the city directors
gave Trahan consent to review the reports. Id. at 299.
81. Id. The term "public records" was defined by the Louisiana court as:
All records, writings, accounts, letters and letter books, maps, drawings,
memoranda and papers, and all copies or duplicates thereof, and all photographs
or other similar reproductions of the same, having been used, being in use, or
prepared for use in the conduct, transaction or performance of any business,
transaction, work, duty or function which was conducted, transacted or
performed by or under the authority of the Constitution or the laws of this state,
or the ordinances or mandates or orders of any municipal or parish government
or officer or any board or commission or office established or set up by the
Constitution or the laws of this state, or concerning or relating to the receipt or
payment of any money received or paid by or under the authority of the
Constitution or the laws of this State are public records, subject to the provisions
of this Chapter except as hereinafter provided.
Id. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:lA(2XWest 1982).
82. Trahan, 365 So.2d at 300. The Louisiana Court of Appeal analyzed the evaluation
process and found that the evaluation reports of the city employees were very personal and
were basically opinions of the individual doing the evaluating. Id. at 300. The court
explained that the purpose of the performance evaluation reports was to provide the
employees' superiors with the information necessary to evaluate the performance of such
employees. Id. The information would aid the employees' supervisors in making a
determination of whether to grant an employee permanent status, awarding merit raises,
recognizing superior and inferior performance, and other matters which pertain to good
management. Id. Consequently, the Louisiana Court of Appeal stated that the
confidentiality of the reports was very important, and therefore held that the individual
rights of the employees prevailed over the public's "right to know." Id.
83. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
84. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10. Article II, section 10 of the Montana Constitution
provides in part: "Right of Privacy. The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-
being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest." Id.
85. 207 Mont. 513, 675 P.2d 962 (1984).
86. Missoulian v. Board of Regents of Higher Educ., 207 Mont. 513, -' 675 P.2d 962,
973 (1984).
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Regents of Higher Education (Board), in Missoulian, which was
responsible for hiring, firing, and supervising the presidents,
adopted procedures for the evaluation of university presidents.87
The Performance Evaluation Policy established by the Board cre-
ated two levels of evaluation, an annual review and a more thor-
ough periodic evaluation to be done every three years. 8
Individuals evaluated under the Board's Performance Evaluation
Policy were informed that confidentiality would be observed
throughout the evaluation process.8 9
At the Board's meeting on April 21, 1980, the Missoulian, a
local newspaper, requested that the Board allow individuals from
the Missoulian to attend the performance evaluation of one of the
university presidents.9 ° The Missoulian also sought access to the
evaluation documents.9" The Board denied the Missoulian's
request, stating that the demand of individual privacy clearly
exceeded the merits of public disclosure. 2 The Missoulian
brought an action against the Commissioner of Higher Education
and the Board under the "right to know" provision of the Montana
Constitution and the Montana Open Meeting Act, challenging the
closure of the evaluation meetings.93 The Board moved for sum-
87. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 964.
88. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 964. The annual review by university presidents consisted of
the president preparing a list of goals and objectives for the institution and an informal and
confidential discussion of performance between the president and the Board of Regents of
Higher Education (Board). Id. at __, 675 P.2d at 964. The periodic evaluation of university
presidents was more formal and complex. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 964. A president receiving
a periodic evaluation was to prepare a thorough evaluation of the university administration.
Id. at __, 675 P.2d at 964. During the periodic evaluation, people in close contact with the
president, including his faculty, staff, students and administration, were interviewed by the
Commissioner of Higher Education on various aspects of the president's performance. Id.
at __, 675 P.2d at 964. The Board would then discuss the periodic evaluation and results of
the interviews with the president. Id. at __, 675 P.2d at 964.
89. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 964. The Commissioner of Higher Education gave each
interviewee an assurance that the interview would be confidential. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at
964. The Board's Performance Evaluation Policy specified that "the principle of
confidentiality would be observed throughout the review process" and that the principle
would "apply to written documents and to discussions among all those who participate." Id.
at __, 675 P.2d at 964. Several of the presidents indicated that they would have written the
self-evaluations differently if they knew that the evaluations were to be public documents.
Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 966.
90. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 964. The Missoulian argued that the meetings held for the
discussion of the university presidents' performance evaluations involved "the carrying out
of the public's business in public education and therefore the public should be apprised."
Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 964.
91. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 964.
92. Id. at -' 675 P.2d at 964. After the request to review the particular president's
evalution documents was denied, the Missoulian changed its request to include access to all
presidential evaluations. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 965. This request was also denied. Id. at __
675 P.2d at 965.
93. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 965. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9 (right to observe
deliberations of all public bodies except where need for individual privacy is greater than
need for public disclosure); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203 (1987Xmeetings of public
252
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mary judgment alleging that neither the constitutional nor statu-
tory right to know provisions were violated.94 The district court
granted the Board's motion for summary judgment.95
On appeal the issue addressed by the Montana Supreme
Court was whether job performance evaluations of university
presidents, which express subjective comments from Board mem-
bers, anonymous interviewees, and the presidents themselves, are
matters of individual privacy protected by the Montana Constitu-
tion or whether the privacy clause extends only so far as to protect
matters of family or health not affecting job performance.96 The
Missoulian argued that the presidents' job performance is a public
matter which society is unwilling to recognize as private and that
no privacy interest exists which would protect the performance
evaluations from disclosure.97 The Missoulian also argued that the
job performance evaluations were not protected by the privacy
clause of the state constitution because the presidents' privacy
rights were diminished by their status as university presidents.9"
The Montana Supreme Court rejected the argument that the sta-
tus of university presidents diminished their privacy rights.99 The
supreme court emphasized that disclosing the presidents' job per-
formance evaluations would not only violate the university presi-
dents' privacy interests, but would affect the privacy rights of
numerous administrative staff, faculty members and other univer-
sity employees having a considerable privacy interest in the evalu-
ation sessions.'0 0
organizations or agencies supported in whole or in part by public funds must be open to the
public except where individual privacy concerns outweigh merits of public disclosure or
where open meeting would have detrimental impact on collective bargaining or litigation).
94. Missoulian, 207 Mont. at -, 675 P.2d at 963. Initially, the Board moved for
summary judgment shortly after the action was filed. Id. at -., 675 P.2d at 963. The motion
was denied by the district court on November 10, 1980, after the issue was extensively
briefed and. argued. Id. at __, 675 P.2d at 963. After discovery was completed, both parties
moved for summary judgment. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 963.
95. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 963. On June 17, 1982, the district court granted the Board's
motion for summary judgment, sustaining closure of the meeting. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 967.
96. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 967.
97. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 967. The Missoulian contended that university presidents
could have no reasonable expectation of privacy unless. it was encompassed in the narrow
areas of personal health and family which do not affect job performance. Id. at __, 675 P.2d
at 967.
98. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 969. The Missoulian argued that university presidents were
policy-making officials whose actions were of great importance to the public and whose
privacy rights were diminished by their status as public officials. Id. at __, 675 P.2d at 969.
99. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 969. The Montana Supreme Court agreed that the university
presidents' privacy interests may be less, in some circumstances, than other employees. Id.
at __, 675 P.2d at 969. However, the court indicated that the university presidents are not
expected to waive their constitutional protection by taking office and stated that the
presidents' privacy interests were strong enough to protect the confidentiality of their
performance evaluations. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 969.
100. Id. at __, 675 P.2d at 969. The matters discussed with regard to the numerous
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The Montana Supreme Court referred to Trenton Times Corp.
v. Board of Education,'° ' a New Jersey case in which a similar
issue was raised.10 2 In Trenton Times the New Jersey Superior
Court found that personnel records and evaluations of a school
superintendent were private matters not subject to the public's
right to know.1 0 3 The court in Trenton Times stated:
Personnel records . . . include employees' performance
ratings. The policy to keep performance ratings confiden-
tial has been adopted: first, to protect the right of privacy
of the government employees; second, because the evalu-
ations are subjective opinions of the performance of the
employee that vary with the person giving the rating;
third, public disclosure would impede receiving candid
evaluations; and fourth, a supervisor could use the public
nature of these ratings as a vindictive mechanism against
employees he dislikes. The lack of objective criteria, the
potential for vindictiveness, the lack of an opportunity for
the employee to rebut statements made in the rating, and
a substantial potential for abuse leads to the conclusion
that these ratings should be kept confidential.
10 4
administrative staff, faculty members, and other university employees, the court stated, was
of a sensitive and personal nature and would reasonably be expected to remain confidential.
Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 969.
101. 138 N.J. Super. 357, 351 A.2d 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
102. Missoulian, 207 Mont. at -, 675 P.2d at 969-70; see Trenton Times Corp. v. Board
of Educ., 138 N.J. Super. 357, -, 351 A.2d 30, 31 (App. Div. 1976). In Trenton a newspaper
publisher filed a complaint pursuant to the New Jersey Right to Know Law, requesting that
the Board of Education and the superintendent of public schools permit the publisher to
inspect and copy a letter addressed to the superintendent. Id. at __, 351 A.2d at 31. For the
text of the New Jersey Right to Know Law, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-2 (West Supp.
1988Xall records required by law to be kept are deemed public records). The letter in
question contained a notice of nonrenewal of the superintendent's contract. Trenton Times
Corp., 138 N.J. Super. at -, 351 A.2d at 31. The letter also included an unsolicited
evaluation of the superintendent's performance. Id. at -, 351 A.2d at 31. Because the
statement in the letter was regarded as confidential, the statement was not placed in the
superintendent's personnel file, or in any other file under the control of the Board of
Education of the City of Trenton. Id. at -, 351 A.2d at 31.
103. Trenton Times Corp., 138 N.J. Super. at -, 351 A.2d at 34. The New Jersey
Superior Court indicated that no statute requires an evaluation of an employee's
performance to be given in connection with a notice of nonrenewal in the absence of the
employee's request. Id. at __, 351 A.2d at 32. In Trenton Times the proferred evaluation
was purely gratuitous because the superintendent never requested any reasons for
nonrenewal or any evaluation of his performance. Id. at -, 351 A.2d at 32. The letter
written by the Board of Education was for the superintendent's information and was not
placed in the superintendent's personnel file nor retained by the board itself. Id. at -, 351
A.2d at 32. At all times, the letter was regarded as personal to the superintendent,
confidential, and of a sensitive nature. Id. at -, 351 A.2d at 32.
104. Id. at -, 351 A.2d at 33. By applying the explanation of "personnel records" that
depicts the importance of confidential performance ratings, the court found that disclosure
of the letter sent to the superintendent would be a violation of his right to privacy. Id. at -'
351 A.2d at 34.
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The Montana Supreme Court recognized that the reasons sup-
porting a policy of confidential evaluations coupled with the dan-
gers of public disclosure recognized by the New Jersey court were
valid."t 5 Thus, in Missoulian, the Montana Supreme Court held
that university presidents' job performance evaluations were mat-
ters of individual privacy, protected by the Montana
Constitution. 106
In 1981, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed a prob-
lem similar to that addressed in Trenton Times and Missoulian in
City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald. °7 The court
addressed the issues of whether municipal personnel files were
public records subject to disclosure pursuant to section 44-04-18 of
the North Dakota Century Code and article XI, section 6 of the
North Dakota Constitution, and whether disclosure of the contents
of a personnel file would constitute an impermissible invasion of
privacy.'0 8
In Grand Forks Herald the plaintiff, S. D. Knutson, was
employed as the chief of police by the City of Grand Forks (City)
until August 20, 1973, when he resigned.'0 9 In 1980, Knutson
became a candidate for the office of county commissioner of Grand
Forks County." 0 On August 18, 1980, a Grand Forks Herald
reporter approached the personnel director for the City and
requested an opportunity to inspect the City's records relating to
Knutson's employment as the chief of police."' The personnel
director refused to allow inspection of the records. 12 The City
commenced a declaratory action against the Grand Forks Herald
105. Missoulian, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 207 Mont. 513, __, 675 P.2d 962, 970 (Mont.
1984).
106. Id. at -, 675 P.2d at 970. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
107. 307 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1981). See Missoulian, 207 Mont. 513, 675 P.2d 962 (1984);
Trenton Times, 138 N.J. Super. 357, 351 A.2d 30 (App. Div. 1976). Missoulian is discussed
supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text. Trenton Times is discussed supra notes 101-104
and accompanying text.
108. City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d 572, 575 (N.D. 1981). See
also N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1978Xpublic or governmental records are open for
public inspection except as otherwise specifically provided by law); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6
(public or governmental records are open for public inspection unless otherwise provided
by law).
109. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at 573. During the time that Knutson was
employed by the City of Grand Forks (City) as chief of police, a personnel file was kept by
the City. Id. at 574.
110: Id. at 574. Because Knutson was a candidate for a public office, a Grand Forks
Herald reporter was interested in making the contents of Knutson's personnel file open to
the public. Id.
111. Id. The Grand Forks Herald reporter was interested in the records specifically
relating to Knutson's employment and the terms and conditions of a negotiated settlement
of resignation agreed upon between the City and Knutson. Id.
112. Id.
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on August 25, 1980, stating that the documents in Knutson's per-
sonnel file were not subject to disclosure, notwithstanding the pro-
visions of section 44-04-18 of the North Dakota Century Code." 3
On September 17, 1980, the district court held a declaratory
judgment hearing in which the city personnel director testified
about particular items generally found in personnel files main-
tained by the City, including work evaluations, salary changes,
Internal Revenue Service forms, insurance matters, retirement
matters, credit reports, and reports relating to mental illness or
alcoholism. 1 4 The district court determined that the personnel
file maintained by the City was a public record within the mean-
ing of article XI, section 6 of the North Dakota Constitution" 5 and
section 44-04-18 of the North Dakota Century Code."
6
On appeal the City argued that the municipal personnel files
were not public records subject to disclosure because chapter 44-
04-18 of the North Dakota Century Code and article XI, section 6
of the North Dakota Constitution do not define the term
"records." 1 7 The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with
the City's argument, stating that the term "records" as used in sec-
tion 44-04-18 of the North Dakota Century Code and article XI,
section 6 of the North Dakota Constitution was intended to have
an expansive meaning."" The court indicated that the City is a
political subdivision of the State, and therefore, all of its records
are considered public records open equally for inspection to mem-
bers of the public." 9 The court concluded that absent a specific
exception which would somehow preclude inspection of the per-
113. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1978). For the text of § 44-04-18 of the
North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 7. In its prayer for relief, the City requested a
declaratory judgment to determine the rights of the parties and also to determine whether
personnel files are public records open for inspection. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at
574. The Grand Forks Herald requested a writ of mandamus from the district court, but
the district court denied the request. Id. In its answer submitted on September 15, 1980,
the Grand Forks Herald asserted that the City did not have standing to seek a declaratory
judgment; that the complaint filed by the City failed to state a claim on which relief could
be granted; and that the City's claim was frivolous. Id.
114. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at 574. The personnel director did not testify as
to which documents were specifically contained in Knutson's personnel file, but rather what
documents were generally contained in the personnel files maintained by the City. Id.
115. See N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6. For the text of article XI, section 6 of the North
Dakota Constitution, see supra note 9.
116. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at 574. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1978).
For the text of section 44-04-18 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 7.
117. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at 577.
118. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18; N.D. Const., art. XI, § 6.
119. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at 578. The City argued that thought processes,
work product, preliminary data, and work sheets and notes are not considered records. Id.
In turning away the argument the court noted that no specific exception existed in North
Dakota law which would allow even these matters to be withheld from public inspection.
Id.
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sonnel file, the file should be open to public inspection. 120  The
court advised the City and Knutson to seek a remedy with the
legislature.'
2 1
The North Dakota Supreme Court also addressed the issue of
whether disclosure of Knutson's personnel file would constitute an
impermissible invasion of his right of privacy. 122  The court
explained that no violation of a right of privacy could be found
because "a generalized right of privacy is not mentioned in the
Federal or State Constitutions; thus, if a right of informational pri-
vacy does exist it has not yet been recognized.'
' 23
Although the United States Congress has enacted an informa-
tional privacy statute based upon the assumption that a constitu-
tional right of privacy exists, the North Dakota Legislature has not
enacted any similar legislation.' 24  Other than the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures accorded by article I,
section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution, no statutory or consti-
tutional right of privacy has yet been recognized under the North
Dakota Constitution.
125
The North Dakota Supreme Court re-examined the potential
existence of an informational privacy right in Hovet v. Hebron
Public School District.126 In Hovet the court addressed the issue of
whether a public school teacher had a privacy right which would
120. Id. The court stated that no statutory authority specifically prescribed the
maintenance of municipal personnel files or the material to be retained in the files. Id.
However, the court reasoned that the expansive language of § 44-04-18 of the North Dakota
Century Code seemed to imply that these personnel files were public records open to
inspection. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1978). Both article XI, section 6 of the
North Dakota Constitution and section 44-04-18 of the North Dakota Century Code
specifically state that "except as otherwise provided by law," public records are open for
public inspection. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at 578. See N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6;
N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1978).
121. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at 578.
122. Id. Knutson asserted that a right of informational privacy existed under both the
federal and the state constitutions, thereby preventing the disclosure of the contents of his
personnel file. Id. Knutson relied on the tort of invasion of privacy in reaching this
assertion. Id. However, whether the tort of invasion of privacy exists under North Dakota
law has not been decided. Id. See Volk v. Auto Dine Corp., 177 N.W.2d 525, 529 (N.D.
1970Xwhether a tort action lies in North Dakota for an invasion of a person's privacy has not
been considered); Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at 578.
123. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at 578. But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965Xseveral guarantees in the Bill of Rights protect privacy interests and create a
penumbra of protection for other unenumerated rights).
124. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at 579. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended as 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982Xrecognizing right of
privacy is a "personal and fundamental right" protected by the constitution and specifying
the requirements necessary for maintaining records on individuals)).
125. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at 579. See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8 (protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures).
126. 419 N.W.2d 189 (N.D. 1988).
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be violated- if his personnel file was open to the public.12  A
number of North Dakota Supreme Court decisions have estab-
lished that once a record is determined to be a governmental rec-
ord it must be open for public inspection under the North Dakota
Constitution and state statutes. 128 Hovet and the School District
both agreed that the personnel file was considered a governmental
record for purposes of determining if it was subject to the North
Dakota open records law. 129 However, they argued that section
15-47-38 of the North Dakota Century Code provided an implied
exception to the open-records law, thereby protection Hovet's
personnel file from inspection.13 0  Hovet -and the School District
reasoned that section 15-47-38 of the North Dakota Century Code
was designed to protect a teacher's reputation because of its
requirement that certain executive session proceedings be fol-
lowed when a school board discharges a teacher.' 3' In addition,
Hovet and the School District stated that opening a teacher's per-
sonnel file to the public harms the goals of facilitating openness in
the proceedings and protecting the teacher's reputation provided
for in the executive session proceedings.
32
127. Hovet v. Hebron Pub. School Dist., 419 N.W.2d 189, 190 (N.D. 1988).
128. Id. at 190. See, e.g., City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d 572,
577 (N.D. 1981Xgovernmental records are required to be open for public inspection);
Forum Publishing Co. v. City of Fargo, 391 N.W.2d 169, 171 (N.D. 1986Xdocuments
submitted to assist in hiring city police chief were considered public records); Williston
Herald, Inc. v. O'Connell, 151 N.W.2d 758, 763 (N.D. 1967Xpublic has a right to inspect
records of judicial proceedings after the proceedings are docketed). Grand Forks Herald is
discussed supra notes 108-25 and accompanying text.
129. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 190. Hovet and the School District agreed that the
personnel file was considered a governmental record by applying previous North Dakota
Supreme Court decisions. Id. See, e.g., City of Grand Forks ;. Grand Forks Herald, 307
N.W.2d 572, 577-78 (N.D. 1981Xpersonnel file of the chief of police was considered a
governmental record and was therefore open for public inspection); Forum Publishing Co.
v. City of Fargo, 391 N.W.2d 169, 172 (N.D. 1986Xapplications submitted to a consulting
firm under contract to the city to assist in hiring a police chief were considered
governmental records and were therefore considered "public records" subject to the open
record law requiring disclosure to the public). In Forum Publishing Co. v. City of Fargo,
the North Dakota Supreme Court explained that the purpose of the open record law would
be thwarted if documents so closely connected with public business were found not to be
public records. Id. at 172.
130. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 191. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-38 (Supp. 1987)
(procedure required for discharging teachers). Section 15-47-38 of the North Dakota
Century Code specifies the procedures used when a school board discharges a teacher or
does not renew a teacher's contract. Id. Procedures provided in section 15-47-38 of the
North Dakota Century Code include: 1) upon the decision for a nonrenewal, the reasons for
not renewing a teacher's contract must be taken from specific and documented findings
arising from formal reviews conducted by the board with respect to the teacher's overall
performance; 2) these proceedings are to be held in an executive session unless both parties
agree that they may be open to the public; 3) no action for libel or slander shall lie for
statements expressed at the executive sessions. Id.
131. Hovet, 419 NW.2d at 191.
132. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-38(2XSupp. 1987Xspecial meeting on teacher's
nonrenewal shall be in executive session unless both school board and teacher agree it shall
be open to the public).
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The North Dakota Supreme Court responded to Hovet's argu-
ment that there was an implied exception to the open records law
by stating that such a contention ignored the plain language of the
open records law. 3 ' The North Dakota Supreme Court con-
cluded that because the open records law provides that govern-
mental records are records open for public inspection "except as
otherwise specifically provided by law," an exception to the open
records law may not be implied.'3 a The court stated that because
of the plain terms of North Dakota's constitutional and statutory
provisions, a record will not be excepted from the open records
law until its status is specifically addressed by the legislature.'
35
Therefore, the court concluded that the contention that section
15-47-38 of the North Dakota Century Code implies an exception
to the open-records law for teacher personnel files must fail.' 36
The North Dakota Supreme Court next addressed the argu-
ment of Hovet and the School District that an exception to the
open records law for teachers' personnel files can be based on
chapter 15-38.2 of the North Dakota Century Code.' 37 Chapter
15-38.2 of the North Dakota Century Code generally provides that
a teacher has a right to review his or her personnel file and add
written comments to the file. 138 Chapter 15-38.2 also prohibits the
use of secret personnel files that are not accessible to the
133. Id. The open records law provides that governmental records are open to the
public "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by law." N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-
18(1X1978). In analyzing this provision, the court in Hovet indicated that the North Dakota
Century Code provides that "words used in any statute are to be understood in their
ordinary sense, unless a contrary intention plainly appears .. ." Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 191.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-02 (1987). In addition, the court also stated that the word
"1specific" is usually defined to mean "[e]xplicitly set forth; particular, definite." Hovet, 419
N.W.2d at 191 (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1173 (2d college ed. 1973)). The
definition of "specific," the court noted, is opposite to the meaning of "implied," which is
defined to mean "suggested, involved, or understood although not clearly or openly
expressed." Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 191; see AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1173 (2d
college ed. 1973). Thus, the court concluded that an exception to the open-records law may
not be implied. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 191.
134. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 191. A record may not be excepted from the open records
law unless the legislature has specifically addressed the status of that type of record and
concluded that the record is "confidential" or not open to public scrutiny. Id.
135. Id. at 191. The North Dakota Supreme Court's decision that specific action must
be taken in order for a record to be excepted from the open records law is supported by
comments made at the time the open records law was being considered. Id.
Representative Ralph Beede, speaking on behalf of the open records law at the time of its
enactment in 1957, stated "that if administrative agencies, such as the State Public Service
Commission which gets certain private information from utilities, feel they have records
that should be kept confidential, 'they should come to the Legislature and let it decide on
the question.'" Bismarck Tribune, February 15, 1957, at 1, col. 2.
136. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 191.
137. Id. at 192. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.2-01 (1981 & Supp. 1987Xteacher has a
right to review his or her personnel file).
138. Id. ch. 15-38.2 (1981 & Supp. 1987).
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teacher. 139 Because the status of teacher personnel files as open or
closed records is not specifically addressed in chapter 15-38.2 of
the North Dakota Century Code, the supreme court concluded
that this argument must also fail due to the fact that an exception
to the open records law may not be implied.
140
Hovet also alleged that he had a right to privacy guaranteed
him by the United States Constitution and the North Dakota Con-
stitution which would be violated if his personnel file was allowed
to be opened for public inspection.' 4 ' The North Dakota Supreme
Court referred to its decision in City of Grand Forks v. Grand
Forks Herald where it rejected the claim that a governmental
employee's personnel file was protected by a constitutional right
of privacy.142 In rejecting Hovet's argument, the court indicated
that it had not been shown that a teacher's personnel file is any
different from that of other governmental employees.
143
139. Id.
140. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 192. The North Dakota Supreme Court indicated that the
argument that there is an exception to the open records law for teacher personnel files
based on chapter 15-38.2 of the North Dakota Century Code was similar to the School
District's initial contention that an exception to the open records law may be implied in
section 15-47-38 of the North Dakota Century Code because the statutes do not specifically
address the status of teacher personnel files. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court restated
that an exception to the open records law may not be implied. Id. In addition, the court
noted that the legislative history of chapter 15-38.2 of the North Dakota Century Code
indicated that the legislature did not address the open records law when it considered the
status of teacher personnel files. Id. The legislature stated that the purposes of the open
records bill were: "(1) to prevent and prohibit secret files; and (2) to provide a reasonable
method for allowing teachers to see what is in their personnel file." Sen. Educ. Comm.
Minutes (Jan. 31, 1977).
141. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 192. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
Hovet argued that Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District was applicable to his
case because teachers, like students, do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the
schoolhouse gate." Id. See Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969Xprohibiting high school and junior high school students from wearing armbands as a
symbol of opposition to the Vietnamese War violated the students' first amendment rights).
142. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 192. See City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, 307
N.W.2d 572, 578 (N.D. 1981). In Grand Forks Herald the North Dakota Supreme Court
decided that personnel records were not protected by the right of privacy arising under the
federal constitution because the federal right to privacy has not been recognized as
applying to the particular subject of personnel files. Id. The court also refused to find that a
right to privacy arising from the North Dakota Constitution protected a governmental
employee's personnel record. Id. The court noted that no explicit right to privacy exists
under the North Dakota Constitution and thus declined to consider whether a privacy right
could be inferred under the North Dakota Constitution. Id. The court specifically stated in
Grand Forks Herald that even if a right to privacy existed under the North Dakota
Constitution, there would be no right of privacy "in a personnel record of a person
employed by a public agency .. "" Id. at 580.
143. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 192. The North Dakota Supreme Court referred to the
recent decision of Klein Independent School District v. Mattox to illustrate that teacher's
personnel files are no different from the personnel files of other governmental employees.
Id. See Klein Indep. School Dist. v. Mattox, 830 F.2d 576, 579 (5th Cir. 1987); cert. denied
108 S. Ct. 1473 (1988). In Mattox the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit discussed the
possibility of applying a right to privacy where a request had been made under the Texas
open records law to view a teacher's college transcript. Id. at 577. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit rejected the teacher's right to privacy claim under the federal
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Hovet referred to the Louisiana case of Trahan v. Larivee to
support his argument that a teacher's personnel file is protected by
a privacy right. 144 In Trahan, the Louisiana Court of Appeal held
that allowing evaluation reports of city directors to be open for
public inspection would constitute an impermissible invasion of
privacy.145 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court distin-
guished Trahan because the Louisiana Constitution expressly
guarantees a right to privacy in article I, section 5.146 Thus, the
supreme court concluded that because the North Dakota Constitu-
tion does not expressly guarantee a right to privacy, Hovet's per-
sonnel file was a public record open for inspection, the disclosure
of which does not constitute an invasion of privacy.'
47
Hovet's final contention was that students had a privacy right
which would be violated if a teacher's personnel files were open to
the public.148 The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to con-
sider this issue, stating that even if it recognized that a student had
a privacy interest needing protection, the consideration of that
issue would violate the general rule that "a litigant may assert only
his own constitutional rights, unless he can present 'weighty coun-
tervailing policies.' -149 The North Dakota Supreme Court indi-
cated that Hovet had not raised sufficient "weighty countervailing
constitution, stating: "Without engaging in an inquiry into whether [teacher] Ms. Holt has a
recognizable privacy interest in her college transcript, we believe that, under the balancing
test, even if she did have an interest, it is significantly outweighed by the public's interest in
evaluating the competence of its schoolteachers." Id. at 580. The Texas open records
statute contains a provision which exempts from public disclosure the "information in
personnel files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy." TEX. REV. CIV..STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(aX2) (Vernon 1988). Even
though the Texas open records law had an exception for information of a private nature
contained in personnel files, the court in Mattox required disclosure, finding that "the
disclosure of a school[-]teacher's college transcript [does not rise] to the level of that
information which constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Mattox,
830 F.2d at 581.
144. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 193. See Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So.2d 294 (La. Ct. App.
1978). In Trahan the court refused to allow evaluation reports of city directors to be open
for public inspection even though the reports were considered public records because to do
so would constitute an impermissible invasion of privacy under the Louisiana Constitution.
Id. at 300. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (every person shall be secure in his person,
communications, and papers against unreasonable invasions of privacy). Trahan is discussed
supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
145. Trahan, 365 So.2d at 300.
146. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 193. Compare LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (every person shall be
secure in his person, communications, and papers against unreasonable invasions of privacy)
with N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8 (right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures).
147. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 193.
148. Id. Hovet indicated that the names of students may be placed in a teacher's
personnel file which the public should not be allowed to inspect. Id.
149. Id. See State v. Woodsworth, 234 N.W.2d 243, 249 (N.D. 1975Xgeneral rule is that
the constitutionality of a statute cannot be challenged on the ground that it may
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others unless there are weighty countervailing
policies).
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policies" to depart from the general rule.15 0 The supreme court
recognized that Hovet and the School District had raised strong
public policy arguments for excepting teacher personnel files from
the open records law.' 5 1 However, the supreme court stated that
policy considerations are to be addressed by the legislature and
the law must be applied as it presently exists.
152
The North Dakota Legislature, in enacting the open records
statute, most likely left the term "record" undefined so that it
would be given a broad meaning. 153 Both the North Dakota opens
records law and article XI, section 6 of the North Dakota Constitu-
tion specify that "except as otherwise provided by law" public
records are to be open for public inspection. 15 4  The phrase
"except as otherwise provided by law" implies that the legislature
has the authority to make certain records confidential.'
55
Because North Dakota remains one of the few states that has
not enacted specific informational privacy statutes, the personal
information contained in personnel files remains subject to public
inspection.' 56 However, as indicated by Justice VandeWalle, spe-
cially concurring in City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald,
one should not eliminate the possibility that "such a right might
exist in the future with regard to personal information contained
in the records of public agencies but which information does not
affect the operation of that agency as a public agency.'
157
Lisa Hall
150. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 193. See State v. Woodsworth, 234 N.W.2d 243, 249 (N.D.
1975Xwhere sufficient countervailing policies are demonstrated, one who does not come
within First Amendment protection may nevertheless attack it).
151. Hovet, 419 N.W.2d at 193.
152. Id.
153. City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d 572, 580 (N.D.
1981XVandeWalle, J. concurring specially). Leaving the term "record" undefined also vests
wide discretion in the public officer. Id.
154. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1978Xgovernmental records are open for
public inspection); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6. For the text of article XI, section 6 of the North
Dakota Constitution, see supra note 9.
155. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at 580.
156. See 85 Op. N.D. Att'y Gen. 4 (1985Xprivate investigator's report, prepared at
request and in possession of state college, concerning college faculty member, not exempt
from North Dakota open records law).
157. See Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d at 580 (VandeWalle, J., concurring).
262 [Vol. 65:241
